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“Uses” and “ab-uses” of history. Possible consequences for history teaching at 
schools*
1 Introduction
Use and Abuse of History. The terms central in the subject of this conference are both: quite 
strong and quite unclear – especially when applied to a subject like history. When confronted 
with the suggestion to contribute to the discussions, here, I immediately had some associations 
coming to my mind which had nothing to do with history at all, but with a series of “abuse”-sub-
jects in public debate of recent years – mostly abuse of children by adults in educational or reli -
gious institutions, by parents, and so on. Surely, this was not what was meant by the colleagues 
suggesting this venue. So I put these associations at bay – but they will play a role in my talk  
later on.
Of course, I was also reminded of professional debates not only more close to, but rather dir-
ectly central in the area I am working on: theory of history, namely the question of the possibil -
ity of truth and objectivity in our domain. This is  something many colleagues have reflected 
upon and where some fundamental insights have been gained in the last decades. So the ques-
tion for me was in this case, whether under the heading of “use and abuse” there was to be an-
other discussion of objectivity. I doubted that this would meet much interest, here. So I tried to 
put this strand aside, too.
There is, of course another strand of debate, related to the latter, which is much more prone to 
the subject of this event, and that is the question of responsibility of professional historians and 
all others presenting accounts of the past – more concrete, the question of what history to tell  
and what not to tell. It is the question about the correct, not the true, history, even though the  
two questions are strongly interrelated, at least from some points of view. 
Much more rewarding, so I thought, would be the subjects covered by others, about how to ad-
* This article represents a Talk delivered at the EUSTORY Seminar “(Ab-)Uses of History”,: Helsinki; August, 7 th – 
10th, 2011.
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dress controversial and “problematic” issues in research and teaching. From my point of view, I  
might already state here at the beginning, there is not the question on whether to present a 
specific historical account, it is not about properly selecting, but rather about the attitudes, the 
function and the methods. In my view, it is not the “what” but the “how” and “what for” of his-
toriography and history teaching, which merit reflection. So “use” and “abuse” are not about  
whether presenting a specific subject, a specific story, amounts to abuse, but whether there are 
specific criteria by which to judge about the “how” of this presentation.
Tow more points of start for my reflection need to be mentioned. First of all, the terms “use and  
abuse” are far from well elaborated. They are used quite differently, especially in our domain. 
This needs to be reflected, first. And here a reference needs to be made to the recent discus-
sions about child abuse.
Secondly, the question of “uses” of history (in the more proper sense) has already been ad-
dressed by colleagues. Margret Macmillan, the renowned Canadian colleague, has published a 
popular reflection on it quite recently, and one of the colleagues present here, Klas Göran Karls-
son, has taken up the question of uses and even of ab-use at a conference in November 2008,  
the proceedings of which have just been published. It is his very short answer of the question 
what defines abuse, which I'd like to initially cite, criticising one of his ideas, but to finally come 
to a conclusion, which can be read as a support of his.
2 The problem of “use and abuse” I: Terminology
Within his considerations, Karlsson, however causally quotes Friedrich Nietzsche's second “un-
timely considerations”. This famous text, which starts with an appraisal of the animals' ignorance 
of any history, their living only in a present, thus being free from any obligations of any past, and 
of a “superhistorical” standpoint (which in my view, informed by Jörn Rüsen, would rather be an 
exemplaric  use  of  history),  and  then differentiates  between three  “uses”  of  history  (monu-
mental, antiquarian, critical), all  of which are deeply rooted in present needs, has at least in  
some English editions (although not the better one used by Karlsson) been titled “Use and Ab -
use”. This notion is problematic. Nietzsche most profoundly did not want to constitute a specific 
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criterion for proper use of history lying in its own domain, but reflected upon the advantages  
and disadvantages of history (thus the best translation, similar to that of the edition used by  
Karlsson: “uses and disadvantages”).1 As for the subject of my talk and of the whole conference, 
I take it that we don't talk about “advantages” and “disadvantages”, about the “pros” and “cons” 
of referring to the past, that its is not a question of whether to “use” history in the first place, 
but that we do talk about the dimension of proper and improper use.
3 Uses and Abuses – A Question of Typology?
In his presentation in 2008, Klas-Göran Karlsson distinguished different “uses” of history, as had 
Margret Macmillan: In short, their reflections, which are both very interesting and valuable to 
read, can be summarized as a typology of motivations of presenting accounts of the past for 
reasons which lie in the present. There are quite a variety of such motivations and of specific  
structures of presentations following them. The enumeration here can give just an overview. 
1. scientific usage: characterized by internal criteria of quality and validity, by the 
idea of approximating an ideal knowledge or at least the idea of progressively 
“better” understanding, by the regulative idea of a dissociation between the au-
thors' interests and the subject matter researched, and by the idea that teaching 
and telling (Karlsson speaks of “mediation”, which is by far a too reflective term 
for the position sketched here) means “transport” of the proper knowledge into 
the learners' or readers'/listeners' minds (which is thought possible because the 
“true” history – even though “valid” and “relevant” – is conceived as independent 
from the recipients' perspectives and interests as from the researchers'.
2. Existential use of history
3. moral use of history
4. ideological use of history
1 Karlsson (2011), p. 132 citing Nietzsche, Friedrich (1983): „On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.“ In:  
Nietzsche, Friedrich: Untimely Meditations. Cambridge: Cambridge, UP, pp. 57-124.
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5. “non-use”
6. “politico-pedagogical use” 
7. MACMILLANS “History for Comfort”
1. History as the ultimate explanation for life
2. History as an escape from the present 
3. History as a book of examples for good and evil
4. History as the judge for current politics
5. History as a field of current politics (reconciliation, repentance, apologies, his-
tory wars)
All of theses uses – as is made explicitly clear by Karlsson, have their merits, their own dignity.  
They cannot be just divided into supportable and insupportable, in uses and abuses. This in part 
is due, I'd like to suggest, that Karlsson's and Macmillan's typologies are not “pure” typologies,  
listing mutually exclusives modes or ways of “using” history, but rather relevant and combinable 
dimensions which need to be discerned within any “use” of history. It may be true that there is 
no necessity for them all to be present in a randomly selected use, but at least some of them will 
always be there in combination: politico-pedagogical use can be highly driven by moral consider-
ations, or by ideological ones, and so on. 
For us, glad to say, this is no problem, because Karlsson does not single out some as proper and 
others as improper. The criterion for abuse, according to him, is – in a pictorial metaphor – not a  
division between some of them and others, but lying across them, dividing feasible and fallible 
versions in each category: for him, it is the violation of human rights. 
But: is this a criterion which is in any way helpful as to the specificities of history? Can it be satis-
fying to refer to a criterion outside the theory of history, only? Isn't there something like an in -
side criterion as to when a presentation of history, a story etc. amounts to abuse? 
In general, I'd like to support Karlsson's liberal view that there is not one “correct” use of history, 
not one way of “doing it”, which takes all the merits, but that the diversity of “usages” can be 
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feasible and supportable – especially that it is not just the “scientific” use or the history of the 
historians, which has more dignity. Margret Macmillan also rejects the idea that history belongs 
to  the historians,  even though she  more strongly  keeps up the  idea that  historians  have  a 
stronger capacity to formulate valid histories, mostly because of their possibility to take more 
time and efforts on the task (because they are trained and paid to do so), but also with a refer-
ence to the idea that historians can be more impartial, more distanced than normal people. 
Throughout her book, the idea is visible that there is one criterion for use and abuse which  
comes from history itself, namely the appropriateness of the depiction of the past: The past it-
self is the criterion for use and abuse of history. 
To  a  much lesser  degree,  this  criterion  is  also  discernible  in  Karlsson's  other  differentiation 
between a genetic and a genealogical mode of history. “Genetic” he calls – not as the first – the 
“perspective” in which we gain and transmit knowledge about the development up to now, 
whereas the term “genealogical” refers to the “making” of history “by reflecting ourselves and 
our present situation in the past” (Karlsson 2011, 133). His (supportable) ideal is the “balance” 
of these two modes in what he calls a “reflective historical consciousness”,2 which could “join 
these  two  fundamental  historical  perspectives  in  so  far  that  a  genealogical  perspective  can 
provide genetic  history with agency and criteria of  relevance,  while  a  genetic  perspective is 
needed not only to supply us with historical contents, but also to help us understand why history 
is recalled and represented the way it is.” (Karlsson 2011, 134). He links this to Kierkegaard's  
dictum about living life forward, but understanding it backward. Again: Supportable as this view 
is, it is also problematic, insofar as it sums up to differentiating between a knowledge of the 
“real history” of the “contents” (what ever that means: what is the container of these contents?) 
and its uses in the present, between the substratum and the operations. This, to my view, can 
not hold. I will dwell on this point from another angle in a few minutes, but would like to sketch 
my solution here in advance, first: I don't think that there is a possibility of any division between 
the substratum of  historical  “contents”,  of  any “real”  history and the operation of  historical 
thinking. In my theoretical framework, they are linked together much more profoundly than sug-
2 Reference to the FUER project and the discussion about whether historical consciousness were not reflective by 
default or by definition (Pandel, Schönemann) in Germany? Support for Karlsson's position.
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gested by Karlsson. It is not a question of joining these two perspectives or modes, but whether 
they can be separated from one another in the first place more than analytically. I suggest that  
what Karlsson calls “genealogical” is a modus, a mode of asking, of the operation which essen-
tially turns our advertence to things past and their interconnections, in the first place, while 
what he calls “genetic” is a mode of answering to such questions stemming from the genealo-
gical perspective. “Genetic” then can be the type of history told when asked for one's genealogy. 
However, it is not the only mode for such narrative answers. Jörn Rüsen already distinguished at  
least four of them in his well-known typology later on corrected and refined by Bodo von Borries  
(and me).3 Genealogical questions, questions asked with a view to the past out of a present need 
for agency and relevance, can not only be answered by telling a genetic story highlighting and 
stressing a development of fundamental changes, but also by referring to rules and laws cover -
ing situations occurring in quite different times (the exemplaric mode) or by referring to well-es-
tablished traditions (the traditional mode). 
Thus – and this is why I refer to this point here – the differentiation between the history and its  
“use” is erroneous: History, or rather: histories, do only come into existence by “usage”. They are 
not a substratum already present when the genealogical interest starts acting – at least not in 
the way suggested by the title of this conference and by Karlsson and more strongly by Macmil-
lan.
4 The Problem of “Use and Abuse” II: Conceptualization
I already hinted that I think that the idea of “using” history is wrong in a certain way. In order to 
illustrate this, I'd like to refer to the already mentioned debate on child abuse: When the media 
started to be full of this concept of “child abuse”, some of the brighter commentators immedi -
ately asked (without wanting to play down), whether talk of child-abuse was not a problem in it -
self, because it forces us to think about what a proper “use” of children would be. Can children 
be “used” so that one can differentiate other uses as improper, which then are called “abuse”?
3 On this,  see Körber,  Andreas (2011):  “German History Didactics:  From Historical  Consciousness to Historical 
Competencies  –  and  beyond?”  In:  Historisch  denken  lernen.  http://koerber2005.erzwiss.uni-
hamburg.de/wordpress-mu/historischdenkenlernen/2011/12/11/1348/, p. 13f.
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The idea behind this challenge of the public debate and its terminology is conceptual: Whoever 
uses the term “child abuse” refers to a concept of “child use” and in it to a concept of children as  
being “objects”. Human rights, however, demand – at least when based on the ideas of Kant – 
that no human being be treated only as a means to some outside aim, that no human being be 
treated as an object only.
Let's dwell for a moment on the notion of “usage” and on the connotation of the object implied 
in it. 
Clearly, in this understanding of “usage”, of “emploi”, the object is already there before it is used 
– we have already seen that point. But more – it also is considered of existing as it is independ-
ently of the usage. The object to be used is seen to have an existence and a specific constitution 
independent from the usage and the user. If to people e.g. use a book for gathering information, 
the book it itself, the material text, is given and the same for both of them. If they use it for e.g. 
blocking a door against moving in the wind, the book also is taken as an existing object.
“Using” means to employ an “objectively” existing object for some outside purpose. 
For this kind of notion, there can be some criteria for feasibility considered:
Criteria for feasible uses of this kind may be manifold:
1. The first criterion may be whether the object was intended for the purpose. Thus 
to take a book for reading may be more feasible than for using it for blocking a 
door against wind etc. But as we can see, this not a necessary criterion: it may be 
feasible to “ab-use” an object for a new, unintended purpose, if other criteria ap-
ply:
1. First, that the objects really helps to fulfil the function. The object must be 
useful. In constructivist terms, what us central here, is the viability.
2. Second, whether the object is damaged in such using. If a book is most likely 
to be squeezed to unreadable status by the wind-moved door, its deploy for 
this purpose may be rendered “ab-use” in the normative sense.
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3. Thirdly, another criterion can refer to the symbolic value of the object. Using a 
book for stopping a door against  wind may be feasible for  someone, even 
though he would call the use of a Qu'ran abuse.
All these criteria have two things in common:
1. They refer to cases in which objects were used for purposes for which they were not in-
tended. 
2. They are applicable – as said before – if history is to be conceived as a pre-existing entity,  
unchanged for all of its users.
So we should once more think about what history is and what it is made for. 
1. If “history” refers to an entity independent from our usage, to the real past or at least  
our best knowledge of it, we should, I think, easily confer that it was NOT made for any  
of our uses. It is one of the thoughts stressed in some early concepts of post-modern 
theory of history: Our predecessors, the people having lived before our times, did not do 
so in order to provide us with “content”, with examples. They may not be reduced to be-
ing the substratum of our own orientation. The question, then, is not that of what kind of  
use would amount to ab-use, but whether history should be used at all. If we take this ar-
gument seriously (and I think we should), it would forbid any “use” of history for some 
other purpose that to “live it”. “History” taken as the past entity of reality and the lives in  
it, clearly have no other purpose that to exist.
2. If “history” does not refer to this past reality, but to our own concepts of them, to our  
constructions, then we cannot object to such “usage”, because history is not used as a 
distinct object were, but is is created in this operation in the first place.
So I clearly tend to the second understanding of history – and I would preserve the term for it.  
The former, the real lives of the people in the past, for their hopes and values etc., should be 
called “the past” only.
So again, we arrive at a distinction which is very central: The reality of other times is “the past”.  
It can be used, and maybe also “abused” in the meaning of the term used in recent discussions: 
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improper, condemnable emploi of an existing object. 
But clearly, this does not mean that “anything goes”, that everybody is unconditionally free to 
create any historical account she or he wishes, that there are no criteria whatsoever. 
So let's try to take the argumentation a bit further:
History in the understanding just outlined is a relational concept. It is not the past in itself, but a 
certain relation between the past(s) and a specific present – more precisely: a specific social, cul-
tural, normative and temporal position. Therefore, criteria for the feasibility of histories can only 




Since we do not have any other access to the past reality as the substratum of historiography, 
we cannot compare any given history to this reality, but only either to other histories of the  
same narrative (and that is:  selective, partitional,  perspectival,  normative etc.)  nature.  If  we 
want to test the empirical plausibility of a history, then we should test it against the current ac-
cessible amount of best first-hand data. As for the normative ingredients, we need to compare it  
to our own audience and society's values and as for the narrative plausibility we have to refer to  
the current ideas of what is acceptable in terms of explaining etc.
But this may not be enough for our purpose. I only referring to Rüsens tripartite concept of  
plausibilities, we have reduced the question of ab-use of history to the question of “objectivity”. 
I don't think this is satisfactory. 
So I think we should take into account another characteristic of “history” in the narrativist mean-
ing: “History” – even though an individually created narrative relation to the past – is a commu-
nicative concept. History unfolds its full capability of orientation if it does not only link us as indi-
4 The German term “Triftigkeit” normally can be translated to “cogency”, which however connotes too strongly  
the aspect of “forcing”, of leaving no alternative, which is not implied here.
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viduals,  quasi  as monads,  to a past  that  is  foregone,  but  if  it  helps  us understand how our 
present society in its complexity has been come about and how it is perceived by others. If we 
want to be able to act in our society, we do not only have to clarify our own relation to the past,  
but we have to do so with that of our co-members of society also. It is not only about who I 
think I am in my light of the past, and what I make of it, about my intentions and motivations, 
but also about
• who the (different!) others think they are, in their view of the past, what their 
perceptions of themselves are and their possible actions,
• who I think they are and what they could or should do,
• who they think I or we are, etc.
For this collective orientation, we need to exchange our narratives, we need to tell them, but we 
also need to integrate them.
Form this consideration, long ago laid out by Kurt Röttgers, we can abstract some other criteria  
for use and abuse of history. But before I shortly elaborate on them, I might stress, that from 
here on, these criteria do not refer to “history” as a synonym of “the past”, but that here I refer  
to the narrative relations to the past, which I would reserve the term history for.
1. First of all, if one function of histories is not only to individually, but to collectively orient-
ate, then they need to integrate perspectives. In order to do so, they need to reflect the 
valid perspectives, i.e. the interests, needs, values etc. of today's members of society. A 
history which does not reflect their different perspectives, questions, values, patterns of 
explanation etc. would not be orientating but dis-orientating. So as a criterion, proper 
history have to integrate the perspectives of different partitions of their audience, not to 
impose one perspective on these different fractions.
2. Secondly, histories have to offer narrative explanations, connections, and attitudes to the 
past as well  as conclusions and motivations.  Again it  would be improper (and here I 
would start to use the word ab-use in the full sense) if they imposed such connections 
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and motivations. This criterion needs some more elaboration: How can a history  offer 
but not impose if it is supposed to present such a connection. How can a history fulfil its 
narrative task but not overdue it in this direction? The answer I suggest here is: By allow-
ing the reader, the listener to take his own position in relation not only to the past but to  
the narrative structure of the history itself – by laying open the ingredients, the inner 
structures, so that the reader can relate to them.
If this is what Karlsson meant by not violating human rights, if his criterion was that the audi -
ence, the addressees, the public needs to be taken seriously in their capacity to actively relate to 
story, and that not doing so would be violating human rights – then I fully agree.
5 Using Histories
So slowly taking the curve to the last aspect, I hold that there is a “using” history in the sense of  
“using narrative structures” in human communication. And in this sense, there can be use and 
abuse – and they can be seen on at least two sides of the communication:
1. “Using history” can mean the operations a person carries out with regard to a given, a  
presented narrative, be it their “(cognitive) particulars” (Karlsson 2011, 135), the connec-
tions constructed in it, the conclusions drawn and offered and the appeals made. It can 
consist in their accepting them and in their doubting, their distancing from them, their 
critique.
On the recipient's side, then, proper use of histories would be to recognize and accepts 
one's own capacity and responsibility, one's entitlement, but also obligation to actively 
relate to histories. It means to listen and read thinking.
2. On the author's side, proper use of history the means a way of addressing the recipient  
in a way which again recognizes his competence, it means to not trap him into a situation 
where he cannot actively relate, he may not be overpowered or overwhelmed.5 This re-
5 This aspect is of course not only relevant for history. In teaching contexts, it has been formulated with reference  
to social studies as the first aspect of the „Beutelsbacher Konsens“ – the „Überwältigungsverbot“.
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quires to
1. identify rather than hide the constructional status of the present history, the fact that 
it has been created by a specific, personal authors, with specific questions in mind, a 
specific background etc.
2. to make visible his perspectives and values etc.,
3. to discuss the ingredients of the story, the characteristics of the primary source ma-
terial used, the concepts applied etc.
4. to at least acknowledge, better: indicate, best: present and discuss contrasting and 
contradictory materials, conclusion, judgements,
5. to at least indicate those parts of the story, which are more inferential than others – 
in a pictorial metaphor: which might be drawn in black and white or greyscale rather 
that full colour.
Misuse, or abuse then clearly would be to hinder the recipient to make up his own mind, 
to reflect his/her own situation towards the story told, the “contents”, the values and 
concepts applied etc. Again: to violate the human right to self-determination. 
Two small remarks by the way:
1. Using these criteria, we might easily arrive at condemning much of Eastern German his-
toriography and history teaching – but I am sure that lots of historiography and teaching 
in the “free west” would look meek, too).
2. The concept of “mediation” used by Karlsson and criticised by me above, can be re-
garded from here, too: If “mediation” is considered as “transmission” of a story to an 
audience, their heads and minds only, in a way where it has to be unchanged, this would 
be ab-use. The term “Vermittlung” in German clearly has the same problem. In most 
cases it is taken as “transfer of knowledge” to the students, whereas a proper considera-
tion not only from pedagogical perspective but also from terminology would yield that it 
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has to make different perspectives and understandings, different positions towards an 
object, a “content”, here: a historical account meet and recognize each other.
6 Use and abuse in History Teaching
This leads over to the last aspect: For didactics, use and abuse of history can also be discussed 
on the basis laid down above. 
Any history teaching which only focuses on providing students with (at least parts of) the one 
story in a fashion where it is best unchanged, any teaching which conceals from learners the 
nature both of the specific history at hand (including those in the textbooks) and of history as 
such as a narrative construct, with strengths in orientating offer but also with limits, which con-
ceals that these histories do not just represent the past, but have a function in today's societies  
and that they need to be assessed, related to, analysed and scrutinised, amounts to ab-use. 
History teaching not abusing history (or better: histories) then has to focus on the learners ac-
quisition of the capacities, the competencies to recognize and accept their own responsibility 
and entitlement towards presented stories. Learners must not only learn to tell  stories (in a 
proper way) but also to actively act as critical recipients. This is not only valid with a view to the 
individual's human right of self-determination, but also with a focus on society and on history as 
such: Abuse can only work if recipients do not recognize and actively take their critical role.
History teaching which is about hindering ab-use, then, is about 
1. empowerment – about empowerment of the learners to acknowledge and assert their 
own entitlement 
2. It is about not just teaching “the history”, but also the narrative, constructive logic of his-
tory from the start, 
3. It is about actively addressing historical debates and history wars – but not creating the 
impression that these history debates and wars as such were abuse, but that maybe one 
side, more often some participants on all sides, have better and worse arguments, which 
may be abuse, 
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4. it is about considering the role of history and of specific argumentations in such debates 
and history wars,
5. it is not about avoiding to take sides and stands, but to make clear on what grounds they 
are taken – and about letting the learners to take their own stands (but of course not  
without proper argumentation).
It would be abuse to hinder learners to get insight into the function and role of history and his-
tories in societal debates and to take their own reflected position.
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